2005/01/01 by Henner Gimpel, Gimpel, Henner
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems #Merger and Competition Analysis #action-graph gamescomputational markets #auctions #bidding strategiesNegotiatio #compact representation of games #congestion games #local-effect games
paper · doi:10.4230/dagsemproc.05011.13
openalex publication_date 2005/01/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Game theoretic bargaining models usually assume parties to have exogenously given preferences from the beginning of a negotiation on. Preferences in these models do not depend on the history of offers made during a negotiation. This paper argues that preferences are based on issue-wise reference points changing during the bargaining process as result of the counterpartys offers.