2026/07/31 by Özgün Ekici, Sinan Ertemel, M. Bumin Yenmez
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #econ.TH
arxiv created 2026/07/31 · arxiv updated 2026/08/03
We introduce Rawlsian equity, a notion of fairness for allocating indivisible objects among agents without object-specific entitlements. Rawlsian equity requires that an object not be assigned to an agent who ranks it more highly than another agent unless the latter receives a more preferred object. We show that the set of Rawlsian equitable allocations coincides with the set of stable allocations in an auxiliary market where object priorities depend on agents' preference reports. The agent-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm computes the agent-optimal element of this set, but no Rawlsian equitable rule is strategy-proof in general.