College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

2013/01/01 by D. Gale, L. S. Shapley · 193 citations
Mathematics · Social Sciences · #Computer science #Demography #Family Dynamics and Relationships #Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics #Mathematics #Mathematics education #Sociology #Stability (learning theory)

paper · doi:10.4169/amer.math.monthly.120.05.386

published in American Mathematical Monthly 120(5), 386 (Taylor & Francis)

openalex publication_date 2013/01/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/03

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