2025/01/01 by Cullen Nutt · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #Intelligence, Security, War Strategy #International Law and Human Rights
paper · doi:10.1080/09636412.2025.2467146
openalex publication_date 2025/01/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/30
When do great powers employ covert action, such as meddling in elections or fomenting coups, against their allies? Existing studies expect states to employ covert action when the intervener and target are locked in a dispute or the target opposes the intervener ideologically. This study instead points to a powerful relationship between great powers’ doubts about allies’ future alignment and the use of covert action. Great powers have incentives to act covertly against allies as soon as they worry that the ally may waver. Great powers that intervene against allies enjoy a range of benefits in the covert sphere, rendering their action more likely to be secret and effective. But these advantages could disappear quickly. US behavior during the Cold War supports this argument. The study deepens our understanding of states’ binding strategies and highlights how alliance cooperation renders states more vulnerable to preventive covert action by their allies.