2024/01/10 by Caroline Robbins, Alessandro Brunelli, Jose Casto +11 · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #Corruption and Economic Development #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Political Conflict and Governance
paper · pdf · doi:10.31235/osf.io/9p5h8
openalex publication_date 2024/01/10 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/14
A growing literature in political science examines the tension between secrecy and accountability as democratic leaders conduct foreign affairs. However, this literature presents a puzzle: while observational work shows that leaders make efforts to avoid getting caught, experimental work demonstrates that the public does not have an aversion to leaders acting secretly. What, then, are the electoral costs of acting covertly? To demonstrate the electoral costs of covert operations, we study voters’ reactions to legislative oversight of covert operations, not their reactions to the operation itself. Using a preregistered and well-powered survey experiment with a 2 × 2 factorial design, we show that the legislators’ audience (their in-party voters) overwhelmingly prefers public investigations into covert operations when the operation fails. When the operation succeeds, though, their preferences are much weaker. This dynamic has important implications for foreign policy—the president cannot take necessary risks in protecting the national interest and the investigations harm the country’s international reputation.