2026/07/07 by Nils Holtug · 1 voice
Arts and Humanities · Social Sciences · Neuroscience · #Philosophical Ethics and Theory #Political Philosophy and Ethics #Free Will and Agency
paper · pdf · doi:10.1017/s0266267126100789
openalex publication_date 2026/07/07 · openalex created_date 2026/07/08 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/09
Abstract In this article, some recent objections to prioritarianism are critically discussed, pertaining to, respectively, competing claims and impersonal value. The competing claims objections are due to Michael Otsuka and apply to non-risky, or certain, outcomes. Otsuka argues that prioritarianism fails to fully cater to competing claims when it comes to large losses, rank-switching and saving large numbers of people. The impersonal value objections are due to Martin Hanisch and amount to arguing that it is not only egalitarianism that involves a commitment to impersonal value, so does prioritarianism. In the article, prioritarianism is defended against these objections.