Executives Strike Back: Political Benefits of Sanctioning the U.S. Supreme Court

2024/10/01 by Matthew Montgomery, Natalie C. Rogol, Anna McCaghren Fleming · 1 voice
Social Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Judicial and Constitutional Studies #Law, Rights, and Freedoms #Legal and Constitutional Studies

paper · pdf · doi:10.1017/jlc.2024.10

openalex publication_date 2024/10/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/22

Abstract

Abstract Recently there have been extraordinary instances of public and political elite complaints toward the Supreme Court. Through a survey experiment, we find that when respondents read that a copartisan executive is offended by recent Supreme Court decisions and threatening to ignore future decisions, respondents increase their support of executives’ not complying with and going public against the Court. Additionally, we find that partisans reward candidates by voting for them at higher rates if they ignore a Court decision that harmed the participant’s party. Our findings hold implications for continued institutional arrangements and our understanding of the functioning of our democracy.

Citations

• No Need to Watch: How the Effects of Partisan Media Can Spread via Interpersonal Discussions
• The Influence of Partisan Motivated Reasoning on Public Opinion
• Polarization and Partisan Selective Exposure
• Fear and Loathing across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization
• THE POLITICS OF MOTIVATION
• Misconceptions, Misinformation, and the Logic of Identity-Protective Cognition
• The tie that divides: Cross‐national evidence of the primacy of partyism
• The Parties in Our Heads: Misperceptions about Party Composition and Their Consequences
• Asymmetry of Partisan Media Effects?: Examining the Reinforcing Process of Conservative and Liberal Media with Political Beliefs

Discussions

• An article my coauthors and I are very proud of got published today. It looks at how partisans are now willing to reward executives for ignoring and sanctioning a Supreme Court they do not agree with. [bsky, 1 points, 0 comments]

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