Rationality and the Bayesian paradigm

2015/07/03 by Itzhak Gilboa · 1 voice · 2 citations
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics #Economic Theory and Institutions #Economic theories and models

paper · doi:10.1080/1350178x.2015.1071505

openalex publication_date 2015/07/03 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29

Abstract

It is argued that, contrary to a rather prevalent view within economic theory, rationality does not imply Bayesianism. The note begins by defining these terms and justifying the choice of these definitions, proceeds to survey the main justification for this prevalent view, and concludes by highlighting its weaknesses.

Citations

• Sul significato soggettivo della probabilità
• Tractatus logico-philosophicus
• Agreeing to Disagree
• Upper and Lower Probabilities Induced by a Multivalued Mapping
• A Mathematical Theory of Evidence
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
• The Quarterly Journal of Economics
• Zermelo and the Early History of Game Theory

Cited by

• The evolution of ambiguous beliefs
• Optimal Learning under Robustness and Time-Consistency

Discussions

• I just had cause to read Itzhak Gilboa's (2015) paper, Rationality and the Bayesian paradigm. He has a quite unique view of rationality and I wonder if it might be consistent with your take here. doi [bsky, 1 points, 0 comments]

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