2024/12/06 by Tamás Demeter, László Kocsis, Krisztián Pete · 1 voice · 2 citations
Psychology · #Action Observation and Synchronization #Language, Metaphor, and Cognition #Social Representations and Identity
paper · doi:10.1080/09515089.2024.2436527
openalex publication_date 2024/12/06 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
In Mind as Metaphor, Adam Toon interprets folk psychological discourse metaphorically. Based on Kendall Walton’s theory of metaphor, he argues that folk psychology ought to be understood in terms of prop-oriented make-believe that relies on representationally essential metaphors. Toon insists that this fictionalist view of everyday mental talk preserves what we commonly think folk psychology can achieve: it does not only rationalize but explains behavior causally. In this paper, first we raise concerns about Toon’s characterization of folk psychology as metaphorical. Then we proceed to show that representationally essential metaphors are incompatible with genuine causal explanation. And finally, we argue that no construal of mental fictionalism can preserve the epistemic virtues we commonly ascribe to folk psychological discourse.