2026/02/13 by Nathanial Shannon Blower · 1 voice
Arts and Humanities · Psychology · #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Philosophy, Science, and History #Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
paper · doi:10.1080/09515089.2026.2624729
openalex publication_date 2026/02/13 · openalex created_date 2026/02/14 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/15
I compare Adam Toon’s pretense-theoretic mental fictionalism – which views folk psychology (FP) as reliant on indispensable metaphors of an ‘inner world’ – with Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mind, interpreted therapeutically. First, I argue Toon’s theory presents a challenge to Wittgenstein. If FP metaphors are essential, as Toon claims, Wittgenstein’s therapeutic goal of eliminating misleading ‘pictures’ seems problematic. I propose a modified Wittgensteinian approach, ‘numbers to leave numbers’, suggesting therapeutic techniques can still be effective even if the problematic metaphors cannot be fully discarded. This involves cultivating a habit of focusing on behavioral criteria to transcend certain philosophical puzzles, irrespective of whether the underlying metaphors are optional. Second, I present a Wittgensteinian critique of Toon’s fictionalism. By examining debates in cognitive psychology, such as the status of the ‘mental lexicon’, I question whether Toon’s theory can adequately distinguish between harmless metaphorical pretense in FP and potentially problematic reifications in empirical science. I suggest that Toon’s account might struggle to define when extensions of folk metaphors become ‘too serious’. Alternative mental fictionalisms are briefly considered in this light.