2025/11/24 by Martin Perrin · 2 voices
Social Sciences · #Populism, Right-Wing Movements #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Social Media and Politics
paper · pdf · doi:10.1111/1467-9477.70031
ABSTRACT Does the proportional distribution of office payoffs between coalition partners, known as ‘Gamson's Law’, hold at the local level? And can the inclusion of a populist radical right (PRR) party in a coalition lead to deviations from this law? This article addresses these two questions by examining municipal coalitions that were formed following the 2022 Swedish elections. I demonstrate that Gamson's Law proves relevant at the municipal level in Sweden but find that the PRR Sweden Democrats (SD) face, on average, a disproportional allocation unmatched by any other party. I find that the inclusion of SD is, by far, the most substantively significant factor driving disproportionality. I suggest that relinquishing office positions corresponds to a specific price that the PRR is willingly paying to facilitate inclusion within municipal coalitions. This article contributes to a growing body of literature examining the relevance of Gamson's Law at the municipal level. Furthermore, it identifies a new pattern of deviation relating to the inclusion of a PRR party, inviting researchers to further explore the PRR's impact on coalition politics.