2026/04/12 by David Sørli Nielsen · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #Public Policy and Administration Research #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Local Government Finance and Decentralization
paper · doi:10.1080/03003930.2026.2655689
openalex publication_date 2026/04/12 · openalex created_date 2026/04/14 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/14
This study investigates the impact of non-partisan lists on fiscal discipline in Norwegian municipalities, using new data on actual coalition agreements in three election periods (2008–2019). Unlike prior studies relying on seat shares or inferred coalitions, this dataset captures precise coalition composition. Using panel regressions with fixed effects, I find that a 10-percentage-point increase in non-partisan coalition share reduces the net operating surplus by 256 NOK per capita (p<0.01), equivalent to 1.16 million NOK in a median municipality. This effect is concentrated in small municipalities (351 NOK reduction, p<0.01) and becomes statistically insignificant in larger municipalities. The relationship persists across specifications controlling for seat shares, mayor type, and municipal characteristics. Disaggregated analysis reveals no consistent ideological pattern among traditional parties, suggesting that non-partisan lists weaken fiscal discipline through common pool effects rather than partisan positioning. These findings have implications for institutional design of proportional systems, highlighting fiscal-democratic trade-offs in local governance.