2026/06/17 by Victor Wu, Yusaku Horiuchi · 2 voices
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Composition (language) #Conjoint analysis #Economic Justice #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Judicial and Constitutional Studies #Legal and Constitutional Studies #Polarization (electrochemistry) #Politics #Supreme court
paper · pdf · doi:10.1017/jlc.2026.10029
published in Journal of Law and Courts, 1-24 (University of Chicago Press)
openalex publication_date 2026/06/17 · openalex created_date 2026/06/18 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/19
Abstract We hypothesize that the public assesses U.S. Supreme Court nominees in light of the contemporaneous Court’s partisan composition. In a preregistered conjoint experiment ( n = 9,895), we find that Democrats and Republicans weigh nominee partisanship more heavily when their party is losing the Court and less heavily when their party already enjoys a secure majority. Consistent with affective polarization and threat-based political psychology, however, they care just as much about partisanship when the Court is split as when the other party enjoys a strong majority – even though the new Justice would swing the Court only in the former scenario.