2025/08/04 by Dafni Kalatzi-Pantera, Yun Jung Yang · 1 voice
Agricultural and Biological Sciences · Social Sciences · #Agricultural risk and resilience #Disaster Management and Resilience #Political Conflict and Governance
paper · doi:10.1093/jogss/ogaf033
openalex publication_date 2025/08/04 · openalex created_date 2025/12/28 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/30
Abstract Do disasters facilitate child recruitment by armed groups? Existing research has shown that disasters triggered by natural hazards influence conflict dynamics. We extend this line of research by studying a specific tactic used by rebel groups: child recruitment. We focus on the demand side of child recruitment and argue that disasters increase rebel groups’ need for child soldiers. In particular, we posit that, for rebels who rely on natural resources, funding is abruptly disrupted following disasters. Therefore, in the aftermath of disasters, forcible recruiting children becomes the most cost-effective strategy. We test our hypothesis with a mixed-methods approach. First, we use geolocated data on rebels’ resources and disasters to create a novel measure that captures rebels’ losses due to disasters. We show that rebel groups whose resources are hit by severe disasters are more likely to coercively recruit child soldiers compared to rebels who are not hit by disasters. Second, we present descriptive evidence from the case of Sri Lanka. This research contributes to enlarge the discussion regarding disasters and urges to pay more attention to how environmental changes can affect humanitarian issues in conflict zones.