2026/03/23 by Taylor Madigan, Edward N. Schwartz · 1 voice
Arts and Humanities · Neuroscience · #Embodied and Extended Cognition #Free Will and Agency #Philosophical Ethics and Theory
paper · doi:10.1086/739653
openalex publication_date 2026/03/23 · openalex created_date 2026/03/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Many theories of responsibility claim that holding someone responsible is “incipiently communicative,” but it has been difficult to pin down just what this amounts to. We offer an account of (1) a distinctive sense in which blaming is communicative, (2) what is communicated, and (3) how communication is achieved. Building on the work of Miranda Fricker and others, our account is that blaming is communicative in the sense that it updates a body of mutually represented expectations—normative common ground—which happens via a process of presupposition accommodation.