2025/10/22 by Antti Kauppinen · 1 voice
Arts and Humanities · Social Sciences · #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics #Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
paper · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2025.2569053
openalex publication_date 2025/10/22 · openalex created_date 2025/10/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/31
In his Epistemic Blame (2024), Cameron Boult presents a comprehensive account of epistemic blame as negative relationship modification in response to intellectual conduct that impairs an epistemic relationship. I articulate an alternative conception, according to which the proper basis for a critical epistemic response is violating epistemic normative expectations, and the response consists in holding the target epistemically accountable in a non-blaming way. The key elements of epistemic accountability are non-instrumental downgrading of the target’s standing as a source, partner, and user in social epistemic practices, and endorsement of taking responsibility for the violation. Like blame, this way of holding accountable carries a sting that goes beyond negative judgment, is sensitive to responsibility for the violation (and thus allows for excuses), and is second-personal. In these respects my view is closer to that of Boult than his critics, and can thus be described as a form of moderate rather than radical scepticism about epistemic blame. However, unlike paradigm blame, epistemic accountability is not accusatory or attitudinal, and is only weakly second-personal, since it doesn’t require standing or demand some form of atonement. It is thus best described as an epistemic analogue of blame rather than as a form of blame.