2023/03/17 by Maron W. Sorenson
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Judicial and Constitutional Studies #Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems #Legal Education and Practice Innovations
paper · doi:10.1177/10659129231164604
openalex publication_date 2023/03/17 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/30
Supreme Court oral arguments are often characterized as the Court rapidly firing questions at attorneys who struggle to keep up; however, nearly half of the Court’s utterances come not as questions but as statements. I ask whether patterns of questioning and commenting behavior during oral arguments can predict case outcomes and justice votes. To answer this question, I develop a theory of strategic communication that accounts for the differential ways justices—and other strategic actors—use queries and comments during arguments. Using transcripts from 1981 to 2019, I code for use of questions and statements, finding the two theoretically and empirically distinct: where questions increase a party’s chances of winning, statements increase their chance of losing.