2025/04/12 by Paul Sagar · 1 voice · 1 citation
Arts and Humanities · Psychology · #Philosophical Ethics and Theory #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
paper · pdf · doi:10.1111/ejop.13070
openalex publication_date 2025/04/12 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/17
[W]hat one believes in one area of philosophy should make sense in terms of what one believes elsewhere. One's philosophical beliefs, or approaches, or arguments, should hang together (like conspirators, perhaps).1 Despite his largely deserved reputation as a dense and difficult writer, Bernard Williams displayed a knack for coining memorable and evocative phrases which in due course became broadly synonymous with his own distinct and original claims. “Agent regret”, “moral luck”, “one thought too many”, “government house utilitarianism”, “internal reasons”, “basic legitimation demand”, “vindicatory genealogy” – no matter how much such phrases have gone on to be adopted and employed in wider debates, they remain distinctively Williamsian. And to this list could easily be added another: “the relativism of distance”. Mention this, and anybody familiar with Williams's work, and indeed with the wider literature in moral philosophy, will immediately recognise it as one of his ideas. It may not be too much of an exaggeration to label as canonical Williams's claim that “only when a society is sufficiently ‘close’ to ours, which is to say, roughly, only when it is a real option for us to adopt the ethical outlook of that society, is there any question of appraising its ethical outlook (as ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘unjust’, or whatever)”.2 But if so, it is surprising to discover that this evocative phrase, and the distinctive ideas Williams attached to it, have garnered little sustained critical attention. Furthermore, what attention they have received has tended to be negative: commentators largely find the relativism of distance perplexing, theoretically flawed, implausible, or even incoherent.3 By contrast this paper offers a defence of Williams. It does so via two interlinked strategies. First, aiming to show that the relativism of distance cannot be understood as a freestanding item, but only makes sense when related to the substantive prior argument in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (ELP)4, and yet which existing scholarship has so far failed adequately to do. Second, to show that commentary on this matter has been misguided insofar as critics read Williams as offering a metaphysical theory about relativism.5 As I hope to show, this is not what Williams was doing. Although there are undoubtedly metaphysical aspects to his position, and which must be appreciated if the relativism of distance is to make sense, nonetheless his goal was different. Once we have properly appreciated what that was, we will then be better placed to offer a defence from the criticisms that have been offered. The paper proceeds as follows. Parts II and III offer a detailed reconstruction of the background argument of ELP, before turning to the relativism of distance. These sections are highly exegetical, for which I beg the reader's patience. Part of my contention is that Williams has been subtly yet importantly misread, and in part this is a function of the sheer detail and complexity of his position going underappreciated. To enable proper assessment, that detailed complexity must be brought out – and this cannot be done quickly. Once it is done, however, I turn to defend Williams. Parts IV and V engage the most serious charges, in particular as put forward by Miranda Fricker, but seek to show that her concerns can be allayed. I conclude by reflecting on what the plausibility of Williams's position further signifies, in particular its relation to his critique of “the morality system”. ELP is orientated around Socrates's Question, “how one should live” (ELP 1), unpacked by Williams as best meaning “how has one most reason to live?” (ELP 19). If the answer given to this is: ethically, this invites the spectre of an amoralist “who suggests that there is no reason to follow the requirements of morality” (ELP 22). Against this figure, many have hoped that philosophy might act as a force, to that the that us what to not about but to and in a that will be however, that this is to the too from the that a amoralist will not around to to the given by a there is the that we not to what we to the but what we can and of us are the the we have for and the hope for an of in the of that we properly about it, we find that we are to an ethical we are If such a then even the amoralist is to it, and insofar as they that they is or or any (ELP an when it to the Williams the two to be about and out from the of as by Although Williams is to the that can (ELP The of is this in and it is not to that there is a best of a of which is to to a of the in turn an from ethical it is a that far and yet when from the – from what Williams “the – it that the only that can any of ethical the of an is from the this (ELP one of the of philosophy to in Williams's its to the ethical by of given what we to be of philosophy that Williams is that it cannot ethical and that the to such a is ethical to be to the that philosophy can how we should in (ELP contrast to this, Williams does not to that philosophy can us to better about the that philosophy can what we Williams's is to the for but not only that this from ethical the hope of an ethical theory the but that so a we for the in which we and recognise the of and (ELP ethical theory for Williams is by a of critical (ELP in what for is the of philosophy to engage in critical that The is outlook that a about but a that is about philosophy it is about (ELP the of this is that when we turn to the relativism of it is highly that we will find Williams forward as an ethical which or how we should (ELP The of the argument in ELP to have in is Williams's of the of ethical that a the ethical and the (ELP Williams that when it to it is that a of could be by how are of is the of the a of the that might be by any even if they from (ELP the that there are aspects of could be of the and by any The reason for this that there is a that of and which of can to adequately in By Williams that there is any hope of as the ethical importantly that there can be ethical argument is dense on this but to that the ethical the of and such are which does not how are of Williams that there is no hope that ethical can the of the of the that even if to on ethical such by be to if it by of due to the of or as Williams to of of by The reconstruction of in ELP will when we the best to the relativism of distance. us turn to that of Williams's can be understood as in two out the and the has and as a of one will be when with an of to what is done in the it is part of what makes his ethical that they are for his in to be not but (ELP is for Williams (as we and is best understood as a claim about the of moral that part of what it to be in the ethical is for to in the of the As it in his are of morality that to make it difficult to a morality as only to a “the of which is in any to as As a with an ethical outlook does not own ethical or show it to be relativism is (ELP of relativism that can be out is a relativism which that ethical have an to a given Williams's it is too or too for if a society (ELP which has yet to of the of for the of ethical is yet to even and so cannot be in if a in which are this of ethical that existing and and cannot be only to own to out relativism in that of one ethical can and must when with and must so by existing this that the ethical thought of a can its own it is to what to and even about As Williams is to this is a claim about the of ethical not about or not such thought is if it out to be (as Williams that ethical thought is not relativism about the of ethical does not is ethical outlook be it to to the not that part of it which is its (ELP however, is the If we that is the in of this must part of ethical does not nonetheless are of it that not properly the in which the or of ethical (ELP in It is the that of cannot should ethical when with that it can or should is the Williams which to a of from a of the of we of ethical and the of it may it is that this should it was and not ethical thought (ELP there to be a ethical as to us in and when can be brought out the of the in of moral if with a outlook we it is and proper to to further that we are and they are and ELP if a an to which we to from the (as for a from that we are and they are one we and cannot is that if we been in we as they do. is an and to ethical Once this is the of ethical by ethical – and we are with a about what to in of this, insofar as we are in ethical and cannot The the and with its the we can turn to Williams's To suggests that we must in a we “how much we can find for this, and how far it a to the has To so, the option of that the ethical of one must only to that or to we should that the are and in particular by ethical in terms of the and that to It is that and matter it the contrast of outlook with is one that makes a a question has to be about what is going to be by one or the (ELP it is not the of two ethical that is of but on that such has ethical And what Williams is that there are of there is of ethical insofar as on that a is or that we can find for a of to his turn of phrase, this is the in is that there was to be from even if prior that in Williams the of as which are from the relativism of distance. It is this that Williams's and is commentators the as the relativism of distance as a of philosophical we should that for Williams it as a of what the to is with to ethical a is the best in a given to this in when Williams from but it is to properly the real when there are two and there is a of for outlook is a real By real Williams that an outlook is the one a or that they could to they could to that could it in and on not engage in and so The to which it is to to outlook is largely by if remain it may going to might enable it (ELP it is that a an option is a real option for it to be they may not have understood what the has to they might be in the of a or could be a but the of a or the of a By a can be understood as about two ethical but one of is not a real as Williams “the of a or as of ethical that can only be in with cannot be and even a of could not such has and cannot be that ethical on that cannot be Williams in detail will when we how can be from given that the is the of But for us the The relativism of distance that it is only in real that the of is properly this of is as and no are (ELP is First, it us to make sense of the of that to be the in ethical but not so in (ELP it to no to moral on the of it if one about a of have on the if one in and even so in for this Williams is the we no to the moral of and even when the us that the they was by the outlook in that will not be the when it to the if us that the of to out the of is an part of moral this make the or even it but make it this the relativism of distance to a of moral which not be for that we are with moral in is and makes no but not it is and so, it a to which are with the of how of moral can be if moral are properly and or that such is and that we should as as we on the it further that on Williams's is by only real ethical in the due to the highly of not only does the relativism of distance only of ethical it does not when with in the and By the relativism of distance to the on such – and is we most But it could to if we about have an ethical outlook to ours, but that we will this is that the relativism of distance is for Williams a highly is to find for the in that we it to ethical that with – we sufficiently from us such that on or not ethical going But relativism does not to ethical the are to it is a about moral that we cannot be in such and further that of ethical are of this The to or not a is is to as to a given in ethical is real or The does not the relativism of understood as an but is to and for when it is is to adopt a on the that out to be in such a a to ethical – the we which the of moral with about the of the of the relativism of distance cannot this – it cannot the by – but it ethical to make better sense of the of ethical to a particular of moral there is in is its proper and in Williams's of Williams's position we are in a better position to of the relativism of and to in turn to what it is to I that Williams can be of First, however, it is to in the of the and the of Williams's claims. As should be one cannot to the relativism of distance by a contrast real and the this is Williams's position is not the does not the relativism of understood as of ethical but us to and when a of is adopted as part of a Second, we have that in Williams's own the relativism of distance makes it the only has dense and It is in to that the relativism of distance is not with to the in As a it may be the that sufficiently with Williams on may that the relativism of distance can indeed properly make it the If that is the then no of about will and it will not so much be that the relativism of distance is as that it is as any Williams's will that we to for the of ethical to which we are with moral in but not in to which the relativism of distance as an of moral must be to and or not one with Williams's for how to so, and a of it, with must be the we can turn to criticisms which the relativism of distance These have most been by Miranda Fricker, with of her by and I that the relativism of distance can critique of Williams of two the of which on the of the the on the of going from one ethical outlook to These are insofar as turn on what I to be but to put on Williams's claim that ethical in the and must be with in the may be Williams from the one to claim that can be the that it is not to moral on the and that it is to on to which Williams's position cannot that the Williams's to find for a outlook in the it out in when ethical in the the of Williams's us contention that are indeed that it is to claim there are no moral in the is to of of moral and in the this I that a of could not out around as a moral on the that the and from there to is too As an a of the moral outlook of a It be the – which is not has Williams that not it is an option for us in the to the of of a but I this moral the of in that are to Fricker, we to about a of out the moral outlook of around that the was could the moral outlook of to – in a with a – indeed be and only by the But there is going there and to are that of course not be a that they But that they And that the in and in the of the in to and to in the and that to with was the only that they could what they most this is to be anybody And it will be to and anybody to But to it is not and it could be by was not in the of a or about the of the or It is a real option – one that in the are to and its a real option is by the that there are out there that in theory we could to when we find out that are on are then this moral of the given that such is an part of what it to have in the by that far could if we a of a and then a if we are about it, that from Furthermore, we that they might to one and with a on this of ethical it is not the to we can by and that the and of ethical outlook might its as a real but that it nonetheless is a real option in Williams's for it to be it have to be an in the that in to the or a to to to is indeed in no as a for when we of the – this was a real Williams's position on the as does his of the relativism of distance. us turn to of orientated around her to Williams's about the of moral I her position to of the First, that we to the question we and Williams is understood as that we Against this, to that we are to moral even if with is only Furthermore, Williams as the which to or not is in As is to the claim that one may only a moral outlook if one has to “the of and by a given outlook in own but which as far too to be if we only to engage in of moral when we could in as real then we be not only from and but the is it is no for to to the moral outlook of the of the of and the for it is to adopt the outlook of But if to to outlook is a for to it, then it that we are not to any moral outlook – no matter how far from us it is in has the that we are as from the as we are from the and must adopt the to But not only is that not how we and act – as in the that we it much to the about the of the – it is not what Williams to the relativism of distance was to a sense of of moral on the of going to in to be to the that are from us – and in the to that which Williams the of to moral for in the to Fricker, his position his contrast is not the it to do. is far too a for moral of a given of outlook can be understood as that for such it is only in real that the of and so on can be to in this of is as and no are a on how we Williams's of I two in which this can be The we might of in that is or synonymous with a to not that it is not to be are familiar with this it is how we the when to or when to a in the is the But there is of the which is and it is synonymous with not the or most to given the we might to it as to turn to a with or to a the of a It is not that are or that we to that they should not be done, it is that they are not the most in the of the two will be there is a real The question for is: which of is Williams best understood as his of to Williams in the sense, her of phrases such as that to Williams cannot the or that we cannot and of the and her we moral to even the most and moral And if Williams is in this then her as to if is us that we are not or to moral on the then is to that we and – and the cannot any such I of as in the of one can as the of of its but what does this on ethical or It is not that – one can as the of if one to – but they are and not one to one can engage in of moral if one The however, is: but the If there a then one should no about about that moral outlook relativism of distance Furthermore, if moral in the of and as Williams it then that is reason to – and indeed not can be as Williams this us her of the on Williams's one can the moral outlook of the if one one can the of The question to is: but the If the answer is that one to on the then the of us are to there much in can on for an moral outlook on the if they but the of us will it an of and and not in how one can a the of the but the of us are to that it the and for and not there are for appraising the that have a going for that have of a it that we are only of the – that not so we to be of what they then but around can If we are in of and then we will be to find it that not so a society of there are in which it might – have a – to engage in moral of as a of the we not as but as by the that us have and if not we might this is by the that on ethical with can indeed only be and an ethical outlook is not a real that does not the for the and of cannot hope that we could But they can – and – for the of the and so as the claim that we should be the have a reason to by and that there is a in a moral that so is in even this to the was so that we not to that outlook in any not even the most of suggests that we and be can of course the of if one but what is the in what further which have a If the answer is this the relativism of distance can it as the there are we are to it with to the they are from in that Williams's position does not that are but in to we on the distance. we can that in Williams as to real ethical as what to which we are only to moral if we could to Williams this her that real is too a for moral But as I hope to have this is a of Williams with real and what is by The relativism of distance Williams's of what to the relativism of distance – in terms of are real or the one are or and they are real for – to in and make it to what the is that makes for The which and to what there is for a of is the contrast we are to and we are to contrast may with a is real or and it or but are not what the relativism of It is for there to be on which real with put us no to a it is for with to put us real to a question what to about the of or for an for the relativism of distance is not the that a is or but the of to a as should be this is on a but of Williams the one given by First, Williams does not the to the relativism of distance. is to us to when a outlook is the to on on a given the position is Second, however, is on in that real put us no to a can have the that it is But is if we of an ethical outlook in with the we to what we are going to that we are of its in many the answer might on as But to on as before is a a to a even if the to answer it is only for – but what if It is that no to his claim I that is that the the of is as what to about the of it the or is it the the the on If this a the question about what to about the of the even there be no what to about And if such we be to by a But we such are real with the but the has to defend the relativism of distance from to show not only that it is but that it is that Williams is in what claims. If so, to of the offering a philosophical by what the in relativism and is could be on this for is to Williams of an when from the relativism of or if this was an that it is a for that might does not make of as to it, may be and But us conclude with two the relativism of distance to Williams's wider claims. First, a of the relativism of distance on Williams's but that thought has no of it (ELP as the for ethical – moral that to be and that we only – then the is that ethical thought cannot be it the relativism of distance can this as as what is but it cannot it, only that is indeed not as it Second, we can the relativism of distance as in one to Williams's critique of “the morality system”. detailed of this is far the but we can nonetheless the of the morality as Williams it, is the to put morality to make it a function of the and of us is only for what we the relativism of distance as a to the morality which we are and which moral outlook we to the is and a of it is to recognise that Williams is not only that we to adopt the relativism of distance as part of is that when we on the we should that we are to the relativism of a about us that should make to the But this us to one of his that the morality not an of It is the part of the of of (ELP The relativism of distance is not an of but what it us reason to is that the morality can in only of the outlook of of in ethical the of are and in the of this paper by and I received and from an It is of a to for argument – but in this it is