2024/03/15 by Ted Nannicelli, Andrea Bubenik · 1 voice · 1 citation
Arts and Humanities · Neuroscience · #Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art #Philosophical Ethics and Theory #Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
paper · pdf · doi:10.1093/aesthj/ayad045
openalex publication_date 2024/03/15 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Abstract To what extent, and on what grounds, can we ethically evaluate art from a generative context that is at some significant distance from our present reception context—at enough distance, at least, so that the two contexts differ, in important ways, in aspects of their moral outlooks? This paper has four aims. The modest task of the paper is to show that this question is much more difficult than has been recognised. The somewhat more ambitious goal is a methodological intervention: it is to highlight the need for interdisciplinary research that illuminates the socio-historical specificities of remote generative contexts in a way that allows us to see the relevant ways in which the moral outlooks overlap with ours (or do not). In relation, the third aim of the paper is to argue, with reference to Bernard Williams’s ‘relativism of distance’, that there are some cases in which the moral outlooks of a work’s generative and reception contexts differ so significantly that the warrant for our moral judgments of remote artworks is attenuated—if it exists at all. Finally, we try to demonstrate how the sort of interdisciplinary collaboration we’re advocating might inform our moral judgments of art—more specifically, in a way that invites a degree of quietude or uncertainty about remote artworks that are deeply morally troubling in our present reception context. We do this with reference to the paintings of Titian.