2008/05/01 by Lars Ehlers
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #Economic and Environmental Valuation #Game Theory and Voting Systems
paper · doi:10.1287/moor.1070.0294
openalex publication_date 2008/05/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/11
Roth and Rothblum [Roth, A. E., U. G. Rothblum. 1999. Truncation strategies in matching markets—In search of advice for participants. Econometrica 67 21–43] showed that for matching markets using the deferred acceptance algorithm a physician with symmetric (incomplete) information possibly gains only by truncating her true ranking. We show that in symmetric information environments this result is identical for all priority mechanisms and all linear programming mechanisms introduced in British entry-level medical markets and in public school choice in some American cities.