2014/01/17 by Daniel Chasquetti, Juan Pablo Micozzi
Business, Management and Accounting · Social Sciences · #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Judicial and Constitutional Studies #Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
paper · pdf · doi:10.1111/lsq.12034
openalex publication_date 2014/01/17 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/01
How do legislators develop reputations to further their individual goals in environments with limited space for personalization? In this article, we evaluate congressional behavior by legislators with gubernatorial expectations in a unitary environment where parties control political activities and institutions hinder individualization. By analyzing the process of drafting bills in U ruguay, we demonstrate that deputies with subnational executive ambition tend to bias legislation towards their districts, especially those from small and peripheral units. Findings reinforce the importance of incorporating ambition to legislative studies and open a new direction towards the analysis of multiple career patterns within a specific case.