2024/03/10 by Kristian Gustafson, Dan Lomas, Steven Wagner +3 · 3 citations
Social Sciences · #European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies #Intelligence, Security, War Strategy
paper · pdf · doi:10.1080/02684527.2024.2322214
openalex publication_date 2024/03/10 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/23
Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is a unique case study of the use of warning intelligence.The article shows that whilst Russia's invasion has sparked a wave of interest on aspects of intelligence, including the use of open source and 'prebuttal', the fundamentals of warning intelligencethe forewarning of major threats in a timely manner so policymakers and officials can respond -remain the same as they have always have.The article also suggests that whilst both sides of the conflict had intelligence advantages at the start, intelligence only becomes a significant force multiplier if the consumer sees value in it and uses it.For Russia, significant intelligence advantages were not fully exploited with the effect that they lost the initiative.Ukraine, whilst initially taken by surprise at the tactical and operational level, was able to use intelligence to its advantage.This, we argue, had long lasting implications for the course of the first period of the conflict.