Environmental vertical management reform and data manipulation in the public sector: evidence from China

2024/12/22 by Huange Xu, Guangchen Li, Bo Chen
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Environmental Science · Social Sciences · #China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance #Energy, Environment, Economic Growth #Land Use and Ecosystem Services

paper · pdf · doi:10.1017/s0143814x24000278

openalex publication_date 2024/12/22 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/25

Abstract

Abstract Based on monthly panel data from 2014 to 2020 and employing the staggered difference-in-differences (staggered DID) method, we examine the impact of environmental vertical management reform on data manipulation in the public sector. We reveal that environmental vertical management reform significantly reduces data manipulation in the public sector. Moderating effect analysis shows that economic growth targets weaken the inhibitory impact of this reform. Conversely, public environmental concerns could enhance the inhibitory impact of this reform on data manipulation. Mechanism analysis reveals that environmental vertical management reform works through strengthening grassroots environmental law enforcement. The increased independence of law-enforcing departments has reduced the tendency of local governments to engage in data manipulation.

Citations

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