Does central supervision enhance local environmental enforcement? Quasi-experimental evidence from China

2018/06/07 by Bing Zhang, Xiaolan Chen, Huanxiu Guo · 6 citations
Business, Management and Accounting · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Regulation and Compliance Studies #Energy, Environment, Economic Growth #Corruption and Economic Development

paper · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.05.009

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