2022/04/01 by Hampei Sasahara, Sasahara, Hampei, György Dán +5
Computer Science · Energy · Engineering · #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Electric Vehicles and Infrastructure #Energy, Environment, and Transportation Policies #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Electrical engineering #Systems and Control (eess.SY) #Transportation and Mobility Innovations #cs.GT #cs.SY #eess.SY #electronic engineering #information engineering
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2204.00209
8 pages
arxiv created 2022/04/01 · openalex publication_date 2022/04/01 · arxiv updated 2022/04/04 · openalex created_date 2022/05/05 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
This paper introduces a "green" routing game between multiple logistic operators (players), each owning a mixed fleet of internal combustion engine vehicle (ICEV) and electric vehicle (EV) trucks. Each player faces the cost of delayed delivery (due to charging requirements of EVs) and a pollution cost levied on the ICEVs. This cost structure models: 1) limited battery capacity of EVs and their charging requirement; 2) shared nature of charging facilities; 3) pollution cost levied by regulatory agency on the use of ICEVs. We characterize Nash equilibria of this game and derive a condition for its uniqueness. We also use the gradient projection method to compute this equilibrium in a distributed manner. Our equilibrium analysis is useful to analyze the trade-off faced by players in incurring higher delay due to congestion at charging locations when the share of EVs increases versus a higher pollution cost when the share of ICEVs increases. A numerical example suggests that to increase marginal pollution cost can dramatically reduce inefficiency of equilibria.