2016/11/21 by Skowron, Piotr
#Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Multiagent Systems (cs.MA)
paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1611.06858
We present a new model that describes the process of electing a group of representatives (e.g., a parliament) for a group of voters. In this model, called the voting committee model, the elected group of representatives runs a number of ballots to make final decisions regarding various issues. The satisfaction of voters comes from the final decisions made by the elected committee. Our results suggest that depending on a decision system used by the committee to make these final decisions, different multi-winner election rules are most suitable for electing the committee. Furthermore, we show that if we allow not only a committee, but also an election rule used to make final decisions, to depend on the voters' preferences, we can obtain an even better representation of the voters.