2021/10/20 by Steven-Marian Stengl, Stengl, Steven-Marian · 1 citation
Computer Science · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Mathematics · #Advanced Optimization Algorithms Research #Economic theories and models #FOS: Mathematics #Optimization and Control (math.OC) #Optimization and Variational Analysis
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2110.10627
openalex publication_date 2021/10/20 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Building upon the results in [Hintermüller et al., SIAM J. Optim, '15], generalized Nash equilibrium problems are considered, in which the feasible set of each player is influenced by the decisions of their competitors. This is realized via the existence of one (or more) state constraint(s) establishing a link between the players. Special emphasis is put on the situation of a state encoded in a possibly non-linear operator equation. First order optimality conditions under a constraint qualification are derived. Aiming at a practically meaningful method, an approximation scheme using a penalization technique leading to a sequence of (Nash) equilibrium problems without dependence of the constraint set on the other players' strategies is established. An associated path-following strategy related to a value function is then proposed. This happens at first on the most abstract level and is subsequently established to a narrower framework geared to the presence of partial differential equations in the constraint. Our findings are illustrated with examples having distributed and boundary controls - both involving semi-linear elliptic PDEs.