2023/07/07 by Carlos Luís Parra-Calderón, Calderón, Carlos, John Cotrina +1
Computer Science · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #47J20 #49J40 #91A10 #91B50 #Economic theories and models #FOS: Mathematics #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Optimization and Control (math.OC) #Optimization and Variational Analysis
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2307.03532
openalex publication_date 2023/07/07 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We deal with the generalized Nash game proposed by Rosen, which is a game with strategy sets that are coupled across players through a shared constraint. A reduction to a classical game is shown, and as a consequence, Rosen's result can be deduced from the one given by Arrow and Debreu. We also establish necessary and sufficient conditions for a point to be a generalized Nash equilibrium employing the variational inequality approach. Finally, some existence results are given in the non-compact case under coerciveness conditions.