2005/01/01 by Daniel Eckert, Eckert, Daniel, Gabriella Pigozzi +1
Computer Science · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Judgment aggregation #Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge #belief merging #preference aggregation #social choice theory
paper · doi:10.4230/dagsemproc.05321.8
openalex publication_date 2005/01/01 · openalex created_date 2016/06/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
In this paper we explore the relation between three areas: judgment aggregation, belief merging and social choice theory. Judgment aggregation studies how to aggregate individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective decision on the same propositions. When majority voting is applied to some propositions (the premises) it may however give a different outcome than majority voting applied to another set of propositions (the conclusion). Starting from this so-called doctrinal paradox, the paper surveys the literature on judgment aggregation (and its relation to preference aggregation), and shows that the application of a well known belief merging operator can dissolve the paradox. Finally, the use of distances is shown to establish a link between belief merging and preference aggregation in social choice theory.