vix.ing · top · new · best · stats

Social choice rules driven by propositional logic

2011/07/28 by Rosa Camps, Camps, Rosa, Xavier Mora +4
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #03B42 #91B06 #91B14 #Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) #Auction Theory and Applications #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge #cs.AI #msc:03B42 #msc:91B06 #msc:91B14

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1109.4335

The title has been changed

openalex publication_date 2011/07/28 · arxiv created 2015/05/05 · arxiv updated 2015/05/06 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

Several rules for social choice are examined from a unifying point of view that looks at them as procedures for revising a system of degrees of belief in accordance with certain specified logical constraints. Belief is here a social attribute, its degrees being measured by the fraction of people who share a given opinion. Different known rules and some new ones are obtained depending on which particular constraints are assumed. These constraints allow to model different notions of choiceness. In particular, we give a new method to deal with approval-disapproval-preferential voting.

Related