Optimal Strategies in Perfect-Information Stochastic Games with Tail Winning Conditions

2008/11/24 by Hugo Gimbert, Florian Horn, Gimbert, Hugo +1 · 2 citations
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Economic theories and models #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Applications

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.0811.3978

openalex publication_date 2008/11/24 · openalex created_date 2016/06/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

We prove that optimal strategies exist in every perfect-information stochastic game with finitely many states and actions and a tail winning condition.

Cited by

• Equilibria in Repeated Games with Countably Many Players and Tail-Measurable Payoffs
• Submixing and Shift-invariant Stochastic Games

Related

• Pure and Stationary Optimal Strategies in Perfect-Information Stochastic Games with Global Preferences
• Submixing and Shift-invariant Stochastic Games
• Dynamic Games with Almost Perfect Information
• Pure Strategies in Imperfect Information Stochastic Games
• On Zero-Sum Two Person Perfect Information Stochastic Games