Equilibria in Repeated Games with Countably Many Players and Tail-Measurable Payoffs

2021/06/07 by Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit, János Flesch +5
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Economic theories and models #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Mathematics #Game Theory and Applications #Optimization and Control (math.OC) #Stochastic processes and financial applications

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2106.03975

openalex publication_date 2021/06/07 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

We prove that every repeated game with countably many players, finite action sets, and tail-measurable payoffs admits an ε-equilibrium, for every ε> 0.

Citations

• Optimal Strategies in Perfect-Information Stochastic Games with Tail Winning Conditions

Related

• Repeated Games with Tail-Measurable Payoffs
• Equilibrium in Two-Player Stochastic Games with Shift-Invariant Payoffs
• Absorbing Blackwell Games
• Games with infinite past
• All Games Have Equilibria