2021/01/07 by M A Ruhul Fatin, Fatin, M A Ruhul, Shihan Sajeed +1
Engineering · Physics and Astronomy · #FOS: Electrical engineering #FOS: Physical sciences #Quantum Physics (quant-ph) #Signal Processing (eess.SP) #eess.SP #electronic engineering #information engineering #quant-ph
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2101.03969
Submitted to a peer reviewed journal. 7 Pages, 6 Figures, 1 Table
arxiv created 2021/01/07 · arxiv updated 2021/01/12
The ability of an eavesdropper to compromise the security of a quantum communication system by changing the angle of the incoming light is well-known. Randomizing the role of the detectors has been proposed to be an efficient countermeasure to this type of attack. Here we show that the proposed countermeasure can be bypassed if the attack is generalized by including more attack variables. Using the experimental data from existing literature, we show how randomization effectively prevents the initial attack but fails to do so when Eve generalizes her attack strategy. Our result and methodology could be used to security-certify a free-space quantum communication receiver against all types of detector-efficiency-mismatch type attacks.