Preventing detector blinding attack and other random number generator attacks on quantum cryptography by use of an explicit random number generator

2014/03/02 by M. Stipčević, Stipčević, Mario
Computer Science · Physics and Astronomy · #FOS: Physical sciences #Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture #Quantum Information and Cryptography #Quantum Mechanics and Applications #Quantum Physics (quant-ph)

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1403.0143

openalex publication_date 2014/03/02 · openalex created_date 2016/06/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

A particularly successful detector blinding attack has been recently demonstrated on various quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, performing for the first time an undetectable and complete recovery of the key. In this paper two original contributions are given to understanding and prevention of this attack.

Citations

• Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system

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