Consistency and the exclusion core in object allocation with co-ownership

2025/11/26 by Jun Zhang, Zhang, Jun · 1 citation
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Merger and Competition Analysis #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2511.21155

openalex publication_date 2025/11/26 · openalex created_date 2025/11/28 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

We employ the consistency principle to evaluate core concepts in an indivisible object allocation model with intricate co-ownership. In this environment, the strong core is consistent but may be empty, the weak core is nonempty but neither consistent nor Pareto efficient, and the exclusion core introduced by Balbuzanov and Kotowski (2019), although nonempty and Pareto efficient, fails consistency. We introduce the concept of refined exclusion core that preserves the exclusion-rights approach while restoring consistency. The refined exclusion core eliminates unreasonable allocations admitted by the exclusion core and delivers sharper predictions than existing alternatives.

Citations

• Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems

Cited by

• Rectified strong core in Shapley-Scarf housing markets with indifferences

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