Cores in discrete exchange economies with complex endowments

2020/05/19 by Jun Zhang, Zhang, Jun
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Decision Sciences · #Economic theories and models #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Game Theory and Applications

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2005.09351

Abstract

The core is a traditional and useful solution concept in economic theory. But in discrete exchange economies without transfers, when endowments are complex, the core may be empty. This motivates Balbuzanov and Kotowski (2019) to interpret endowments as exclusion rights and propose a new concept called exclusion core. Our contribution is twofold. First, we propose a rectification of the core to solve its problem under complex endowments. Second, we propose a refinement of Balbuzanov and Kotowski's exclusion core to improve its performance. Our two core concepts share a common idea of correcting the misused altruism of unaffected agents in blocking coalitions. We propose a mechanism to find allocations in the two cores.

Related

• The core in the housing market model with fractional endowments
• Consistency and the exclusion core in object allocation with co-ownership
• Rectified strong core in Shapley-Scarf housing markets with indifferences
• Market, power, gift, and concession economies: Comparison using four-mode primitive network models
• The Core of an Economy with an Endogenous Social Division of Labour