2020/10/01 by Ramin Kaviani, Kaviani, Ramin, Kory W. Hedman +1
Computer Science · Engineering · #FOS: Electrical engineering #Power System Reliability and Maintenance #Power Systems Fault Detection #Smart Grid Security and Resilience #Systems and Control (eess.SY) #cs.SY #eess.SY #electronic engineering #information engineering
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2010.00223
arxiv created 2020/10/01 · openalex publication_date 2020/10/01 · arxiv updated 2020/10/02 · openalex created_date 2022/07/25 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/04
It is possible to launch undetectable load-redistribution (LR) attacks against power systems, even in systems with protection schemes. Therefore, detecting LR attacks in power systems and establishing a corrective action to provide secured operating points are imperative. In this paper, we develop a systematic real-time LR threat analysis (RTLRTA) tool, which can flag LR attacks and identify all affected transmission assets. Since attackers might use random deviations to create LR attacks, we introduce an optimization model to generate random LR attacks. Hence, we can determine accurate thresholds for our detection index and test the tool's functionality when there are random LR attacks. Additionally, based on an estimation for the actual loads in the post-attack stage, we design a set of physical line flow security constraints (PLFSCs) and add it to the security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED) model. We call the new model cyber-physical SCED (CPSCED), which can appropriately respond to the identified LR attacks and provide secured dispatch points. We generate multiple scenarios of random LR attacks and noise errors for different target lines in the 2383-bus Polish test system to validate our proposed methods' accuracy and functionality in detecting LR attacks and responding to them.