2021/05/01 by Falah Alanazi, Jinsub Kim, Alanazi, Falah +4
Engineering · #FOS: Electrical engineering #HVDC Systems and Fault Protection #Power System Optimization and Stability #Power Systems Fault Detection #Smart Grid Security and Resilience #Systems and Control (eess.SY) #electronic engineering #information engineering
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2105.00350
openalex publication_date 2021/05/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We investigate the vulnerability of a power transmission grid to load\noscillation attacks. We demonstrate that an adversary with a relatively small\namount of resources can launch a successful load oscillation attack to\ndestabilize the grid. The adversary is assumed to be able to compromise smart\nmeters at a subset of load buses and control their switches. In the studied\nattack scenarios the adversary estimates the line flow sensitivity factors\n(LFSFs) associated with the monitored tie lines by perturbing a small amount of\nload at compromised buses and observing the monitored lines flow changes. The\nlearned LFSF values are used for selecting a target line and optimizing the\noscillation attack to cause the target line to trip while minimizing the\nmagnitude of load oscillation. We evaluated the attack impact using the COSMIC\ntime-domain simulator with two test cases, the IEEE RTS 96 and Polish 2383-Bus\nSystems. The proposed attack strategy succeeded in causing 33% of load to be\nshed while oscillating only 7% of load in the IEEE RTS 96 test system, and full\nblackout after oscillating only 3% of the load in the Polish test system, which\nis much smaller than oscillation magnitudes used by other benchmarks.\n