2024/03/11 by Erik Voeten · 2 voices · 12 citations
Business, Management and Accounting · Social Sciences · #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Political Influence and Corporate Strategies #Populism, Right-Wing Movements
paper · pdf · doi:10.1177/00104140241237468
openalex publication_date 2024/03/11 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/25
Energy transition policies often have distributional effects that could have electoral consequences. I study this issue in the context of a Dutch policy change that increased taxes on household natural gas consumption and redistributed the revenues as subsidies for renewables. Radical right parties were the only source of political opposition. A Differences-in-Differences (DiD) analysis with panel data from 2007-2020 shows that after the policy change renters with individualized utility bills became 5–6 percentage points more likely to vote for the radical right compared to renters with utilities included in their rents. Renters with individualized utility bills also became relatively less sympathetic towards the Green party and more concerned about price increases but they did not alter their left-right self-placements nor their views on immigration or the European Union. A secondary analysis finds similar effects for individuals (including home-owners) who are energy poor. This suggests an emerging economically rooted political cleavage over energy transition policies.