On the Computational Properties of Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms

2021/01/13 by Golowich, Louis, Li, Shengwu · 1 citation
#Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Economics and business #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)

paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2101.05149

Abstract

We present a polynomial-time algorithm that determines, given some choice rule, whether there exists an obviously strategy-proof mechanism for that choice rule.

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