Strategy-proof allocation with outside option

2020/09/11 by Jun Zhang, Zhang, Jun
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #Economic theories and models #FOS: Economics and business #Merger and Competition Analysis #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2009.05311

openalex publication_date 2020/09/11 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

Strategy-proof mechanisms are widely used in market design. In an abstract allocation framework where outside options are available to agents, we obtain two results for strategy-proof mechanisms. They provide a unified foundation for several existing results in distinct models and imply new results in some models. The first result proves that, for individually rational and strategy-proof mechanisms, pinning down every agent's probability of choosing his outside option is equivalent to pinning down a mechanism. The second result provides a sufficient condition for two strategy-proof mechanisms to be equivalent when the number of possible allocations is finite.

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