2015/01/22 by V. Sasidevan, Sasidevan, V., Sitabhra Sinha +1
Decision Sciences · Social Sciences · #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #FOS: Biological sciences #FOS: Physical sciences #Game Theory and Applications #Physics and Society (physics.soc-ph) #Populations and Evolution (q-bio.PE)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1501.05458
openalex publication_date 2015/01/22 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
The study of games and their equilibria is central to developing insights for understanding many socio-economic phenomena. Here we present a dynamical systems view of the equilibria of two-person, payoff-symmetric games. In particular, using this perspective, we discuss the differences between two solution concepts for such games - namely, those of Nash equilibrium and co-action equilibrium. For the Nash equilibrium, we show that the dynamical view can provide an equilibrium refinement, selecting one equilibrium among several possibilities, thereby solving the issue of multiple equilibria that appear in some games. We illustrate in detail this dynamical perspective by considering three well known 2-person games namely the Prisoner's Dilemma, game of Chicken and the Stag-Hunt. We find that in all of these cases, co-action equilibria tends to correspond to `nicer' strategies than those corresponding to Nash equilibria.