1986/10/01 by Thomas R. Palfrey, Palfrey, Thomas R., Sanjay Srivastava +1
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Allocative efficiency #Applied economics #Economic Theory and Institutions #Economic theories and models #Economic theory #Endowments #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Information economy #International economics #Knowledge economy #Nash equilibrium #Public goods #Social choice
paper · doi:10.7907/0fhs2-c5n57
openalex publication_date 1986/10/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/22
This paper identifies several social choice correspondences which are and are not fully implementable in economic environments when agents are incompletely informed about the environment. We show that in contrast to results in the case of complete information, neither efficient allocations nor core allocations define implementable social choice correspondences. We also identify conditions under which the Rational Expectations Equilibrium correspondence is implementable. We extend the concepts of fair allocations and Lindahl allocations to economies with incomplete information, and show that envy-free allocations and Lindahl allocations are implementable under some conditions while fair allocations are not.