2021/12/11 by Harry Pei, Pei, Harry, Bruno Strulovici +1
Decision Sciences · Social Sciences · #Complex Systems and Decision Making #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #FOS: Economics and business #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2112.06032
openalex publication_date 2021/12/11 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We study whether a planner can robustly implement a state-contingent social choice function when (i) agents must incur a cost to learn the state and (ii) the planner faces uncertainty regarding agents' preferences over outcomes, information costs, and beliefs and higher-order beliefs about one another's payoffs. We propose mechanisms that can approximately implement any desired social choice function when the perturbations concerning agents' payoffs have small ex ante probability. The mechanism is also robust to trembles in agents' strategies and when agents receive noisy information about the state.