Thugs-for-Hire: The Rise and Fall of Political–Criminal Co-Governance in Rural China

2025/07/23 by Jingyi Wang, Peng Wang
Social Sciences · #China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance #Demographic Trends and Gender Preferences #Chinese history and philosophy

paper · pdf · doi:10.1093/bjc/azaf040

Abstract

Abstract In political–criminal co-governance, governments and gangs share authority and collaborate to implement policy. This article draws on empirical data to investigate partnerships between local governments and rural gangs in many Chinese villages. It argues that insufficient finance, limited compliance from villagers and public policy that lacks social legitimacy have compelled township and village governments to use informal coercion via gangsters and adopt political–criminal co-governance to implement unpopular policies and pursue local interests. It also explores how far China’s most recent anti-crime campaign has led to the demise of this type of co-governance in the countryside, enhancing understanding of thugs-for-hire and state–crime relations.

Citations

• The Structure of Trade-type and Governance-type Organized Crime Groups: A Network Study
• Infrastructural Power Revisited

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