Informal Institutions, Collective Action, and Public Investment in Rural China

2015/04/23 by Yiqing Xu, YIQING XU, Yang Yao +1 · 9 citations
Social Sciences · #Culture, Economy, and Development Studies #Social Capital and Networks #China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance

paper · doi:10.1017/s0003055415000155

Abstract

Do informal institutions, rules, and norms created and enforced by social groups promote good local governance in environments of weak democratic or bureaucratic institutions? This question is difficult to answer because of challenges in defining and measuring informal institutions and identifying their causal effects. In the article, we investigate the effect of lineage groups, one of the most important vehicles of informal institutions in rural China, on local public goods expenditure. Using a panel dataset of 220 Chinese villages from 1986 to 2005, we find that village leaders from the two largest family clans in a village increased local public investment considerably. This association is stronger when the clans appeared to be more cohesive. We also find that clans helped local leaders overcome the collective action problem of financing public goods, but there is little evidence suggesting that they held local leaders accountable.

Citations

• Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China

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