2015/11/11 by Nikhil R. Devanur, Balasubramanian Sivan, Devanur, Nikhil R. +3
Business, Management and Accounting · Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing #Economic theories and models #FOS: Computer and information sciences
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1511.03699
openalex publication_date 2015/11/11 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We study a basic auction design problem with online supply. There are two\nunit-demand bidders and two types of items. The first item type will arrive\nfirst for sure, and the second item type may or may not arrive. The auctioneer\nhas to decide the allocation of an item immediately after each item arrives,\nbut is allowed to compute payments after knowing how many items arrived. For\nthis problem we show that there is no deterministic truthful and individually\nrational mechanism that, even with unbounded computational resources, gets any\nfinite approximation factor to the optimal social welfare.\n