2025/05/07 by Jade Garcia Bourrée, Bourrée, Jade Garcia, Augustin Godinot +15 · 1 voice · 4 citations
Computer Science · #Audit #Audit risk #Control (management) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Generalization #Machine Learning (cs.LG) #Neural Networks and Applications #Prior probability #Task (project management) #cs.LG
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2505.04796
published in arXiv (Cornell University) (Cornell University)
openalex publication_date 2025/05/07 · arxiv published 2025/05/07 · arxiv updated 2025/05/22 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05
Among the many technical challenges to enforcing AI regulations, one crucial yet underexplored problem is the risk of audit manipulation. This manipulation occurs when a platform deliberately alters its answers to a regulator to pass an audit without modifying its answers to other users. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach to manipulation-proof auditing by taking into account the auditor's prior knowledge of the task solved by the platform. We first demonstrate that regulators must not rely on public priors (e.g. a public dataset), as platforms could easily fool the auditor in such cases. We then formally establish the conditions under which an auditor can prevent audit manipulations using prior knowledge about the ground truth. Finally, our experiments with two standard datasets illustrate the maximum level of unfairness a platform can hide before being detected as malicious. Our formalization and generalization of manipulation-proof auditing with a prior opens up new research directions for more robust fairness audits.