2017/01/01 by Tony T. Luo, Luo, Tony T., Salil S. Kanhere +7
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · #Auction Theory and Applications #Mobile Crowdsensing and Crowdsourcing #Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data #cs.GT #cs.HC #cs.SI
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1701.00248
6 pages, 4 figures, 2 tables
arxiv created 2017/02/24 · arxiv updated 2018/07/03
Proper incentive mechanisms are critical for mobile crowdsensing systems to motivate people to actively and persistently participate. This article provides an exposition of design principles of six incentive mechanisms, drawing special attention to the sustainability issue. We cover three primary classes of incentive mechanisms: auctions, lotteries, and trust and reputation systems, as well as three other frameworks of promising potential: bargaining games, contract theory, and market-driven mechanisms.