2013/10/07 by Ashwin Subramanian, G. Sai Kanth, Subramanian, Ashwin +4
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Computers and Society (cs.CY) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Mobile Crowdsensing and Crowdsourcing #Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI) #Optimization and Search Problems #cs.CY #cs.GT #cs.NI
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1310.1746
12 Pages, 7 Figures and submitted to IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
arxiv created 2013/10/07 · openalex publication_date 2013/10/07 · arxiv updated 2013/10/09 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
In this paper, we consider the problem of incentive mechanism design for smart-phone crowd-sourcing. Each user participating in crowd-sourcing submits a set of tasks it can accomplish and its corresponding bid. The platform then selects the users and their payments to maximize its utility while ensuring truthfulness, individual rationality, profitability, and polynomial algorithm complexity. Both the offline and the online scenarios are considered, where in the offline case, all users submit their profiles simultaneously, while in the online case they do it sequentially, and the decision whether to accept or reject each user is done instantaneously with no revocation. The proposed algorithms for both the offline and the online case are shown to satisfy all the four desired properties of an efficient auction. Through extensive simulation, the performance of the offline and the online algorithm is also compared.